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ABSTRACT 
ATTRACTIVENESS STEREOTYPE, SEVERITY OF ILLNESS, AND 
PERCEPTIONS OF A CHILD TARGET: DOES CANCER INDUCE UNIQUE 
ATTRIBUTIONAL JUDGMENTS? 
 
Alexandra Telk, B.S., College of Charleston 
M.A., Appalachian State University 
Chairperson: Dorris Bazzini, Ph.D. 
Given that previous research provides conflicting evidence regarding 
perceptions of a target with cancer, the current study aimed to identify whether 
severity of this illness drives perceptions or if the diagnosis of cancer holds unique 
stereotypes in judgment. The study was modeled after Gruman and Sloan’s (1983) 
study, which found that an adult target was rated more positively when described as 
having cancer than when described as suffering from either indigestion or pneumonia.  
Because the illnesses used in their study varied not only in severity, but also 
contagion and localization of the illness, the current study sought to modify their 
design by holding these factors constant and by using a child target.  Two hundred 
ninety-four college students were presented with a stimulus paragraph about a 10-
year-old female child who was described as being in good health or as suffering from 
one of three illness conditions:  (a) a fictitious illness called Haltmar’s disease, 
described like a brain tumor; (b) a fictitious illness called Haltmar’s disease, 
 
vi 
described like cancer; or (c) the diagnosis of cancer. A photo of a 10-year-old girl 
manipulated to look healthy or unhealthy accompanied the materials.  Thus, the study 
employed a 4 (illness) x 2 (child appearance) factorial ANOVA.  Results indicated 
that favorability for the child target was not linearly influenced by severity of illness 
and a cancer stereotype was not observed.  An attractiveness stereotype was not 
detected in the current findings and participants’ Just World Beliefs did not impact 
perceptions of the target. However, when the child was portrayed as sickly and 
unattractive, the illness label was influential on ratings of likability.  
Keywords:  illness, perception, just world belief, attractiveness stereotype, cancer 
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Attractiveness Stereotype, Severity of Illness, and Perceptions of a Child Target:  
Does Cancer Induce Unique Attributional Judgments? 
Almost 40 years ago, Dion, Berscheid, and Walster (1972) conducted the 
seminal study showing the tendency to prejudge others based only on their physical 
appearance. Specifically, they were the first to document an attractiveness stereotype 
whereby more attractive individuals were ascribed more favorable traits and 
perceived to live more satisfying lives than less attractive individuals. The majority of 
research that has followed has demonstrated that individuals attribute generally more 
positive characteristics to attractive people compared to unattractive people (Bassili, 
1981; Dion & Dion, 1987).  Inclusive characteristics range from social advantages to 
generally more positive life outcomes (for a full review, see Eagly, Ashmore, 
Makhijani, & Longo, 1991). A meta-analysis performed by Eagly et al. (1991) found 
that 91% of research has demonstrated evidence supporting the what-is-beautiful-is-
good (WBG) stereotype, although the magnitude of the effect has varied across 
studies.   
Eagly et al. (1991) stated that, “In general, the beauty-is-good stereotype 
should become smaller as the amount of other information about targets increases… 
people combine items of information into an overall judgment” (p. 113).  In other 
words, one may be inclined to stereotype a physically attractive stranger as having a 
positive personality, but the more one is familiar with someone or has personal 
interactions with someone, the less likely one will use the attractiveness stereotype to 
judge that someone (i.e., people rely on cues other than simply physical appearance, 
such as behavioral tendencies).  On the other hand, a person’s previous experience 
PERCEPTIONS OF ILLNESS  3 
 
interacting with attractive people may encourage continued use of the WBG 
stereotype.  It seems reasonable to suggest that if attractive individuals possessing 
positive personality traits and embodying idyllic lifestyles are encountered, the 
attractiveness stereotype would be further perpetuated.   
Research has documented preference for attractive individuals at a very young 
age (Langlois et al., 2004).  Ashmore and Del Boca (1979) described the preference 
for attractiveness as “a structured set of inferential relations that link a social category 
with personal attributes” (p. 225). Ramsey et al. (2004) discovered that infants as 
young as six months have the ability to distinguish between attractive and unattractive 
faces.  Further, infants group faces into attractive and unattractive categories. The 
preference for, and ability to categorize, attractive faces, the authors believe, is the 
cognitive prerequisite of the formation of the attractiveness stereotype. Ramsey et al. 
also predict that after experience and behavioral interaction with attractive and 
unattractive individuals, by early childhood, one’s WBG stereotype develops.    
     Eagly et al. (1991) proposed the media as a possible culprit of bolstering 
the attractiveness stereotype.  People shown in popular media tend to possess above-
average physical appearance and are portrayed as having, overall, generally positive 
characteristics. For instance, motion pictures or television programs may reinforce 
one’s stereotypes about attractive individuals obtaining more social advantages than 
unattractive individuals (Eagly et al., 1991; Smith, McIntosh, & Bazzini, 1999).  
Disney movies have been historically cited as a concrete embodiment of this 
stereotype of unattractive characters portrayed as evil doers, while attractive 
characters are portrayed as heroic and promoting good.  Empirical support for such 
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films reliably linking these qualities was established by Bazzini, Curtin, Joslin, 
Regan, and Martz (2010). They found that across animated Disney films, a strong 
positive correlation existed between a character’s attractiveness and his or her moral 
virtue, intelligence, and positive life outcomes. Furthermore, in a second study 
evaluating the potential impact of viewing such films, Bazzini et al. (2010) found that 
a single viewing of a film strongly endorsing the beauty bias did not affect children’s 
views of a same-age peer.  However, they did find that children ages 6 through 12 
years-old rated an attractive peer more favorably than an unattractive peer, regardless 
of the movie watched.   
Indeed, the WBG stereotype has been documented in children as young as age 
four years-old (Adams & Crane, 1980; Langlois & Stephan, 1977). Studies have 
found that children tend to view attractive individuals as nicer than unattractive 
individuals; however, Adams and Crane (1980) found that children do not necessarily 
prefer attractive over unattractive peers in social play.  According to the research by 
Langlois and Stephan (1977), attractiveness stereotypes overshadow stereotypes 
about ethnicity for children as young as four.  The study found that pictures of 
attractive children were perceived by children the same age as the nicest and the 
smartest no matter which ethnicity was portrayed.  This suggests that the WBG 
stereotype permeates children’s peer relations as well as overall behavioral 
attributions more so than ethnicity.  Simply put, starting at an early age, people rely 
on physical cues, specifically aesthetics, to make judgments. The propensity to rely 
on attractiveness cues as indicators of personality and potential behavior may serve as 
a cognitive heuristic (i.e., simplifying one’s world into general categories). 
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By the age of 6 years-old, children agree with adults on what is attractive and 
what is unattractive (Cavior & Lombardi, 1973).  Cavior and Lombardi discovered 
that children acquire the cultural and social criteria used by adults in judging physical 
appearance. Children ages 5 through 8 years-old rated photographs that were 
previously determined as attractive or unattractive 11- and 17- year-old individuals by 
adult raters.  Cavior and Lombardi found that by age 6, subjects reached agreement 
levels that were not significantly different from adults.  By age 8 there was no 
difference in attractiveness ratings; inter-rater reliabilities between the age groups 
continued to increase.  This indicates that what adolescents view as a standard of 
attractive and unattractive is established as criteria to judge attractiveness levels by 
the age of six years-old.   
Thus, it seems that judging others on physical appearance is visceral and 
ubiquitous.  Physical appearance is conspicuous and therefore a simple way to form 
an initial impression of another individual.  When people assume that attractive 
people have more positive personal traits and life outcomes, it can be said that they 
are engaging in a just world belief (JWB) system (Dion & Dion, 1987). One may 
presume that attractive people deserve good outcomes and positive traits, which 
includes deserving their attractive physical appearance (Lerner, 1965). 
Just World Belief 
Lerner (1965) was the first to provide evidence of the connection between the 
attractiveness stereotype and Just World Belief (JWB).  In this influential study, 
Lerner discovered that people will rationalize outcomes in order to protect their own 
self-esteem. He showed that when an attractive individual was rewarded, even if the 
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person was not worthy of the reward, participants accepted the event by persuading 
themselves that the individual actually deserved the reward.  However, if the person 
getting the reward was unattractive, participants devalued the person and rejected the 
outcome.  Lerner’s research findings have provided empirical support for people’s 
propensity to have a stereotypical belief that the world is a just place. His research, 
and other research that has followed, has demonstrated that people believe that others 
get what they deserve and deserve what they get.   
Beyond judgments related to attractiveness, the JWB is a stereotypical way of 
thinking, which places restrictions and biases on how people view others’ misfortunes 
and sufferings.  Lerner and Miller (1978) defined JWB as a “psychological structure 
and process that may contribute to a pattern of responses including the creation and 
automatic activation of a stable cognitive framework for organizing one’s 
experiences” (p. 1032).  It was demonstrated by Lerner and Simmons (1966) that 
when a person is faced with a situation in which another person is suffering, the 
person will tend to derogate the victim to restore his or her belief that the world is a 
just place (i.e., the person suffering deserves to be afflicted). 
JWBs encompass many aspects of how one thinks and potentially how one 
may behave.  Oppenheimer (2006) postulated that JWBs are societal constructions 
that are modified with experience.  The stereotypical way of thinking that JWBs 
involve, applies to a broad range of circumstances and situations (Murray, Spadafore, 
& McIntosh, 2005). Similar to the attractiveness stereotype, JWBs are activated 
without conscious effort.  JWBs are said to affect how one interprets interpersonal 
interactions with others as well as one’s own personal experiences. JWBs may be 
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viewed as a coping mechanism to buffer against stress developed and cultivated early 
in life (Furnham, 2003; Oppenheimer, 2006).        
Research has demonstrated that the attractiveness stereotype and the JWB 
stereotype can moderate one another. For example, attractive victims are viewed to 
have experienced a more unjust death compared to unattractive victims (Callan, 
Powell, & Ellard, 2007). When Callan and his colleagues varied the levels of 
attractiveness of the victim, it was found that when suffering was portrayed as severe, 
the participants remembered the victim as less attractive.  These findings illustrate 
that the motivation to restore a belief in a just world can be coupled with physical 
attractiveness and ultimately affect perception and memory.  Essentially, this research 
demonstrates that people associate attractiveness, goodness, and happiness.  As the 
saying goes, “bad things do not happen to good people,” therefore, bad things should 
not happen to beautiful people. 
Dion and Dion (1987) found that attractive targets were rated as suffering 
more unjust misfortunes when compared to unattractive targets.  In their research, 
Dion and Dion documented the moderation of the JWB stereotype with the 
attractiveness stereotype.  The authors found that attractive photos were generally 
perceived as having socially desirable personality characteristics, having more 
positive life outcomes, and being more undeserving victims than unattractive photos.  
Furthermore, an interaction was observed in the study: whether participants were 
dichotomized into proponents of or in opposition to JWBs influenced their attitudes 
and perceptions of the stimulus person. Participants who tended to have a greater 
belief in a just world consistently viewed the attractive stimulus person in a more 
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positive light while rating the unattractive stimulus person more harshly on trait 
characteristics (Dion & Dion, 1987).   In addition, believers in a just world were more 
likely to view the attractive victims’ death as unjust compared to the unattractive 
victims’ death.  Ultimately, the research findings indicate that people interpret 
attractive individuals as deserving desirable outcomes because of their physical 
appearance and that they do not merit misfortunes such as death or illness.  
Perception of Illness 
Given the opportunity, research has demonstrated that people avoid those who 
are suffering.  When individuals do interact with the afflicted, it seems to be 
distressing.  For example, Kleck (1968) found that subjects rated a confederate with 
an amputated limb more positively on a variety of traits compared to a confederate 
who was not handicapped.  However, when interacting face to face with a confederate 
with an amputated limb, participants restricted their nonverbal behavior and were not 
forthright in their individual opinions compared to when participants were interacting 
with the confederate who was not handicapped. This demonstrates differences in 
people’s socially desirable and actual behaviors (e.g., a person may behave, or report 
that he or she would behave, a certain way in order to please others and portray a 
more socially acceptable or desirable self).  Ultimately, most likely without 
awareness, people’s reactions to illness and to people with an illness tend to involve 
defensive biases. 
 This response may be because interacting with, or even thinking about, a 
person with illness reminds people of their own vulnerability (Pryor & Reeder, 1993). 
Previous research has demonstrated that people tend to rate themselves as less similar 
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on personality and physical traits when comparing themselves to an undesirable 
person (i.e., a tendency termed defensive distancing; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, 
Solomon, & Cather, 1995). Similarity has been shown to moderate defensive 
distancing: The more similar a victim is, even if the similar characteristics are 
irrelevant to the illness, the more vulnerable one is likely to feel and potentially the 
more defensive one is likely to be (Pyszczynski et al., 1995). Essentially, rating 
themselves as disparate from the victim allows people to feel less vulnerable to a 
similar fate.    
            Pyszczynski et al. (1995) tested whether delay in comparing oneself to a 
victim of illness affects overall similarity judgments.  Participants were presented 
with a vignette that depicted a person who went to the health clinic for either a 
sprained ankle or for cancer.  Participants then rated the victim on a variety of traits 
and rated themselves on the same traits. Overall, it was found that participants liked 
the target with stomach cancer more than the target with a sprained ankle.  However, 
after a three minute delay, participants’ ratings of the sprained-ankle victim increased, 
and less defensive distancing of the target with a sprained ankle was observed relative 
to the non-delay conditions. Defensive distancing was prominent in the cancer 
condition. Specifically, participants in the delay condition denied similarity to the 
target significantly more than in the non-delay condition by rating themselves as 
discrepant from the victim with cancer.  The role of delay seems to demonstrate a 
person’s internalization of the described illness; participants in the delay condition 
had the time to process and become more aware of the threatening nature of the 
illness.   Negative, self-focused reactions to illness seem to conflict with socially-
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acceptable values such as compassion and sympathy.  Yet, as time passes, social 
norms seem to dissipate and defensive biases surface. Again, by unconsciously 
denying one’s similarity to a victim, one discredits the possibility of a similar fate, 
thus feeling more control over the potential threat. 
Weiner (1993) uses the general attribution theory of emotions to examine 
possible reasons why there may be differences in perceptions of particular illnesses.  
The general attribution theory of emotions states there are three dimensions of 
causality that are utilized by people to describe another’s situation:  locus, stability, 
and controllability.  Specific to perceptions of illness, controllability is the most 
relevant. Weiner proposes that a negative event that results from something perceived 
as uncontrollable initiates sympathy, but when an event is construed to be controlled 
by the victim, the perceiver will derogate and demean the victim.  For example, when 
an individual contracts lung cancer, if he or she is a smoker, than an outsider will 
likely blame and derogate the individual.  However, if the victim with lung cancer has 
never smoked, and instead contracted the illness through exposure to secondhand 
smoke, according to Weiner’s attributional theory, sympathy, and possibly empathy, 
will be aroused.   
          The perceived degree of control a person has over an event can influence 
perceptions of the event itself as well as the level of stress experienced (i.e., the 
greater the control, the less stress).  For example, Meyerowitz, Williams, and Gessner 
(1987) found that, as predicted by the JWB stereotype and Weiner’s attributional 
theory, attitudes toward a disease were significantly more negative if the disease was 
described as controllable versus uncontrollable.  What the disease was called, or 
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labeled as, also had a significant effect on judgments made about the victim.  
Perceptions of the disease termed “Haltmar’s disease,” a fictitious disease, were more 
positive than the perceptions of cancer.  Yet, when participants rated the person with 
the portrayed illness, the victims of cancer were liked more than the victims of the 
fictitious disease. In other words, no matter how the situation was described, the 
person suffering from cancer was perceived in a generally more positive light 
compared to the person who was portrayed as having Haltmar’s disease.  This raises 
the question of whether cancer may be perceived differently relative to other diseases.  
There seems to be something anomalous about people’s conceptions of cancer. Just 
the label “cancer” arouses fear and stigmatization, yet the person afflicted with cancer 
is rated empathetically and generally positively. Wortman and Dunkel-Schetter 
(1979) propose that “cancer appears to be unique in its ability to arouse fear and 
vulnerability” (p. 131), and further research has documented this.    
Gruman and Sloan (1983) examined perceptions of individuals who were 
either healthy or were portrayed as suffering from indigestion, pneumonia, or 
stomach cancer. College participants read a stimulus story designed either to promote 
(describing a target close in age and circumstances) or inhibit (describing a target that 
was older, who had never attended college) similarity and, thus, sympathy and 
empathy.  Participants then rated the target on a social attractiveness scale.  Gruman 
and Sloan found that as severity of illness increased, ratings of social attractiveness 
decreased, except for in the cancer condition.  Victims who were diagnosed with 
cancer were viewed almost as positively as a target who was not suffering from any 
illness (healthy; control condition).   
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This furthers the question of whether cancer generates distinct cognitions as 
individuals’ process why others contract the disease relative to other illnesses.  
Because cancer can afflict anyone, no matter what race, gender, or age, the 
vulnerability people may feel when exposed to someone suffering with cancer may 
initiate more empathy and compassion instead of derogation and distancing. 
However, Gruman and Sloan (1983) demonstrated that their manipulation of 
similarity, and thus empathy, did not impact social attractiveness judgments made 
about the target victim. Whether participants read about a similar or dissimilar target, 
ratings of social attractiveness were not significantly different.  In other words, 
Gruman and Sloan concluded that empathy does not affect attractiveness judgments 
according to their experimental results.   
Contrary to the findings provided by Gruman and Sloan (1983), Drury, 
Lehmkuhl, Nabors, and Jiang (2005) found evidence of a decrease in favorability 
ratings in victims with cancer compared to healthy targets.  In their research, children 
were used as stimulus targets. Participants were asked to rate the child victim on a 
variety of traits.  Drury and her colleagues found that adults judged children portrayed 
as the victims of cancer more harshly than children portrayed as healthy.  The authors 
claim that participants’ attributions were based on realistic expectations of the child’s 
situation (i.e., a child undergoing chemotherapy will be less strong, less happy, etc., 
than a child that was not receiving cancer treatment).  Of course, it is unclear whether 
perceivers based their judgments on actual knowledge of the condition of a child with 
cancer or within the context of a JWB system.   In other words, did adults rate the 
child afflicted with cancer as less strong and less happy because they were attempting 
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to rationalize why he or she was afflicted in the first place—that is, might he or she 
have deserved to be afflicted?   
In an experiment performed by Stern and Arenson (1989), subtle 
manifestations of participants’ JWBs were revealed for a child victim of cancer.  
When college students rated a child described as being in remission from cancer or a 
child who was depicted as healthy on a variety of traits, children who were portrayed 
as being in remission from cancer were rated as being less competent, less sociable, 
less well behaved, and less likely to adjust well in the future than the healthy child.  
Participants also scored the child victim as less behaviorally active and less physical. 
In line with what Drury and colleagues (2005) found, the physical and behavioral 
assumptions made about the child might be attributed to rational expectations of the 
child’s physical health after cancer.  However, sociability, general behavior, and 
competence are not necessarily affected by cancer and could be interpreted as JWB 
rationalizations and unjustified attributional derogation in order to restore one’s 
JWBs.     
What is perhaps most compelling and potentially unsettling about both Drury 
et al.’s (2005) and Stern and Arenson’s (1989) research is that the focus of the 
research was a child victim. Despite research that has assessed JWB with adult 
targets; less has been examined focusing upon illness stigma and social judgments of 
children.  For example, though both investigations assessed a child target neither, 
Drury et al. (2005) nor Stern and Arenson (1989) directly measured JWB. 
According to the American Cancer Society (American Cancer Society, 2009), 
there are approximately 11 million people suffering with some form of cancer in the 
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U.S.  In 2008 alone, cancer caused nearly 600,000 deaths just in the U.S.; that is 
22.8% of all deaths in the country.  It is estimated that one in two men and one in 
three women will develop cancer in their lifetimes (American Cancer Society, 2009).  
Cancer is the second leading cause of death in children, surpassed only by accidents 
(American Cancer Society, 2009). Therefore, cancer is the number one disease that 
causes death in children.  Leukemia is the most common form of cancer in children 
(31%), with cancer inflicting the brain and nervous system accounting for 21% of all 
cancer diagnoses in children (American Cancer Society, 2009).  It is predicted that 
nearly 11,000 children under the age of 14 will be diagnosed with cancer each year, 
causing nearly 1,400 predicted deaths in just 2010 alone (American Cancer Society, 
2009).     
           The physical reality for those who suffer from cancer, perhaps more so than 
most other serious illnesses, is that cancer treatment has a direct effect on the 
appearance of the victim.  In most treatments, a patient is likely to suffer hair loss and 
other superficial decline (American Cancer Society, 2009).  This suggests an 
interesting challenge to an individual navigating through JWB cognitive systems and 
WBG stereotypes.  To date, no research has examined perceptions of a target who is 
sick, who also varies on physical attractiveness.  Furthermore, no research has 
examined these variables with a child target.  
Current Study 
The purpose of the current study was threefold.  In its most general sense, the 
study was designed to examine perceptions of a child victim with cancer versus one 
who suffers from some other illness.  This study is essentially a modification of the 
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Gruman and Sloan (1983) study in its assessment of whether severity of illness 
influences perceptions of a target, but the current study used a child, rather than an 
adult, target.   Participants were presented with a stimulus paragraph and photograph 
of a child target.  Participants were asked to make ratings of the child’s likability, as 
well as the child’s social attractiveness and their own social attractiveness as a child.  
Gruman and Sloan used this latter measure as an index of target derogation by 
subtracting the child’s desirability rating from the self-desirability rating.  Recall, 
however, that Gruman and Sloan failed to control for the impact of disease contagion 
in their original study, and the illnesses used in their manipulation affected different 
parts of the body.   Therefore, the current study held contagion constant; recollect that 
Gruman and Sloan used pneumonia as one of their comparative illnesses, which is 
contagious.  The current study also localized the illness to one specific area of the 
body; recall that Gruman and Sloan used indigestion and cancer which inflicts the 
stomach, while pneumonia affects the lungs.   
This study portrayed a child as healthy or suffering from either a brain cancer 
or one of two fictitious diseases called “Haltmar’s disease,” modeled after 
Meyerowitz et al. (1987).  The first condition of Haltmar’s disease was described in 
the stimulus paragraph as similar to the condition of brain cancer; however, the label 
“cancer” was not used.  The second condition of Haltmar’s disease was described in a 
similar way as a benign tumor, but without using the label “tumor.”                 
The illness conditions were developed not only to elucidate perceptions of 
illness due to the severity of illness portrayed, but also were aimed to illuminate the 
potential differences in perceptions due to the label placed on the illness. Therefore, 
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the second goal of the current research was to assess whether cancer holds a unique 
connotation or cognition relative to other illnesses.  Considering that a tumor and 
cancer are both defined as an abnormal growth of cells, any mean differences 
between the conditions in attractiveness ratings would presumably be due to the 
illness label, given that the diseases were described similarly, rather than the illness 
severity. Thus, the Haltmar’s conditions further investigated the significance of the 
label placed on an illness.   
Third, the current study examined the influence of physical attractiveness on 
judgments of the child target.  However, rather than a more traditional approach to the 
manipulation of beauty, the current study assessed the impact of how healthy or 
sickly the target looks.  Participants either viewed a photograph of a 10-year-old child 
in its original, unmodified condition or a photograph that was altered using photoshop 
to look noticeably ill.  Thus, the study employed a 4 (Illness Label: good health, brain 
cancer, Haltmar’s cancer, or Haltmar’s tumor) x 2 (Physical Attractiveness of Target: 
healthy versus unhealthy) factorial design.  
The study also directly measured belief in a just world.  The inclusion of the 
individual difference measure was used with the intent of clarifying why derogation 
of a victim, or lack of such derogation, occurs.   
Hypotheses 
 Due to the possibility of divergent processes influencing attributions about a 
victim of illness, particularly one with cancer, competing hypotheses were proposed: 
Hypothesis 1a:  If cancer carries unique implications for judgments of a target 
(as suggested by Gruman and Sloan, 1983), a main effect of illness condition was 
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predicted such that a child with cancer would be judged more favorably than those in 
the other three conditions. Judgments across the other three conditions were predicted 
as follows: the child with Haltmar's described like cancer should be judged less 
favorably (be derogated more and liked less) than a child with Haltmar's described 
like a tumor, who was expected to be judged less favorably than the child who is 
healthy.  
Hypothesis 1b:  If severity of illness alone drives derogation and likability of a 
victim (presumably by activating JWBs) then, again, a significant main effect of 
illness condition was expected to occur.  However, contrary to Hypothesis 1a, the 
cancer and Haltmar's described like cancer conditions were expected to be rated the 
least favorably.  The child in the Haltmar's described as a tumor condition was 
expected to be rated slightly more favorably than the child in the cancer and the 
Haltmar’s cancer conditions, and the child who was portrayed as healthy was 
expected to be rated the most favorably.  These predictions are in line with the 
findings of Drury et al. (2005), Stern and Arenson (1989), as well as Meyerowitz et 
al. (1987).  
Hypothesis 2:  A main effect of physical attractiveness was also expected, 
consistent with the WBG stereotype.  In other words, the more attractive child target 
(portrayed to be healthy in appearance) would be rated more favorably than the less 
attractive child target with an unhealthy appearance.  Given that this hypothesis does 
not address illness influence on judgment of the target, there is no competing 
hypothesis proposed. 
PERCEPTIONS OF ILLNESS  18 
 
Hypothesis 3a:  If derogation of the target is in line with Gruman and Sloan’s 
(1983) findings, a main effect for illness label was again anticipated to influence the 
perceptions of the child, without the level of attractiveness altering these perceptions. 
Thus, Hypothesis 3a is a reiteration of Hypothesis 1a in that the child with cancer 
would be viewed most favorably relative to the other illness conditions.  No 
interaction between illness type and attractiveness of the child was expected. 
Hypothesis 3b: Previous literature suggests that beliefs about attractiveness, 
and its implicit presumed rewards, would combine with assumptions made about 
illness severity.  Therefore, the results of Drury et al. (2005) and Stern and Arenson 
(1989) could prevail and an interaction between healthfulness and severity of illness 
was expected.  Thus, the child who appeared healthy and was portrayed to be 
suffering from cancer would be rated the least favorably compared to the other three 
illness conditions coupled with a healthy picture. Presumably, JWBs would then 
impact the following conditions such that,  the child who appeared healthy in the 
Haltmar’s condition described as cancer would then be rated the next least favorable, 
followed by the child with Haltmar’s described as a tumor who appeared healthy, 
followed by the child in good health who also looked healthy (who was predicted to 
be rated the most favorably).  
Regarding the unhealthy picture, a different pattern was expected for 
hypothesis 3b.  An interaction between the illness label and the child’s attractiveness 
was anticipated such that the unhealthy child described as suffering from cancer 
would engender feelings of sympathy and would be rated more favorably than the 
remaining three conditions.  The unhealthy, unattractive child who was portrayed to 
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be suffering from Haltmar’s described as cancer would be rated as the next most 
favorable, followed by the unhealthy child with Haltmar’s described as a tumor, 
followed by the unhealthy child portrayed to be in good health.  JWB was not 
expected to impact the participants’ judgments when the child was depicted as 
unhealthy as it did when the child target was depicted as healthy and attractive.  
Instead, sympathy and quite possibly pity, were expected to impact perception. 
Method 
Participants 
          Participants were recruited through the psychology subject pool which 
consisted of students enrolled in introductory and intermediate psychology classes.  
Students participated in the study either to fulfill a class requirement or to earn extra 
credit. Participation was conducted online via Survey Monkey. Due to limitations of 
the website, and concerns about anonymity, gender of the participant was not 
assessed.  Three hundred and forty-eight students participated in the study and were 
randomly assigned to the eight conditions; however, only 294 subjects met the criteria 
for inclusion in the analyses.   
 Participants were removed because they failed the manipulation check (i.e., 
did not indicate the child had an illness when in fact she did; said she did have an 
illness when she did not; left the question blank; or misremembered the illness label). 
Each of the eight conditions lost participants, some more than others: 2 participants 
were removed from the unattractive, good health condition; 14 participants were 
removed from the unattractive, Haltmar’s cancer condition; 10 participants were 
removed from the unattractive, Haltmar’s tumor condition; 5 participants were 
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removed from the unattractive, cancer condition; 3 participants were removed from 
the attractive, good health condition; 11 participants were removed from the 
attractive, Haltmar’s cancer condition; 10 participants were removed from the 
attractive, Haltmar’s tumor condition; and 1 person was removed from the attractive, 
cancer condition . However, homogeneity of variance across conditions was 
maintained based on Levene’s test for equality.  Out of the 294 participants that 
remained in the study, 152 of them were randomly assigned to view the picture of the 
target portrayed as unhealthy while 142 saw the picture of the target portrayed as 
healthy.  Eighty-two people were in the good health condition, 67 were in the 
Haltmar’s tumor condition, 65 were in the Haltmar’s cancer condition, and, finally, 
80 were in the cancer condition.  
 The University’s Institutional Review Board approved this study on March 
21, 2011 (see Appendix A).  It was approved under expedited review and determined 
to contain no more than minimal risk to participants.  All procedures complied with 
the American Psychological Association’s (2002) ethical standards for the use of 
human participants.  
Materials 
Target photographs.  The stimulus photograph, acquired through a publicly 
accessed website, depicted a girl thought to be approximately 10 years of age, and 
was either left in the original condition or manipulated to look less healthful (see 
attached photographs in Appendix B).  A pilot study established that the pictures were 
significantly different from each other on ratings of healthfulness, F(1, 22) = 10.52, p 
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= .004, ηp
2
=.35, and were not significantly different from each other on the aspect of 
realism of the images, F(1, 22) = 0.44, p = .51, ηp
2 
= .02.   
Stimulus paragraph. The stimulus paragraph read as follows: 
Jennifer is 10 years old and from a medium-sized town who has two siblings 
and just started fourth grade.  She is an average student who is doing well in 
math and spelling, but is not doing as well in English and science.  Jennifer 
enjoys soccer, playing outside in the tree house, watching movies, and has 
friends from school and friends from around the neighborhood. 
Depending upon experimental condition, the stimulus paragraph ended with 
one of four statements.  In the control condition, the stimulus paragraph ended with, 
“Recently Jennifer went to the health clinic for an annual physical and was 
proclaimed to be in good health.”  In the Haltmar’s Disease – described as brain 
cancer, the stimulus paragraph ended with, “Jennifer wasn’t feeling well for a four 
day period, and was taken to the health clinic.  After multiple tests were run, the 
diagnosis was Haltmar’s disease.  Haltmar’s disease is defined by a malignant growth 
of cells in the brain.”  In the Haltmar’s Disease - described as a brain tumor, the 
stimulus paragraph ended with: “Jennifer wasn’t feeling well for a four day period, 
and was taken to the health clinic.  After multiple tests were run, the diagnosis was 
Haltmar’s disease.  Haltmar’s disease is defined by an abnormal growth of cells in the 
brain.” Finally, in the cancer condition, the stimulus paragraph ended with: “Jennifer 
wasn’t feeling well for a four day period, and was taken to the health clinic.  After 
multiple tests were run, the diagnosis was brain cancer, a growth of cancerous cells in 
her brain.” 
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  Questionnaires. The multidimensional global JWB scale created by Lipkus 
(1991; internal consistency, measured by Cronbach’s alpha, is .82; see Appendix C), 
included three subscales, each composed of 10 items: personal JWB, interpersonal 
JWB, and socio-political JWB.  Personal JWB is proposed to involve one’s 
perception over nonsocial environments (e.g., “If I suffer a misfortune, I have usually 
brought it on myself in some way.”).  Interpersonal JWB is one’s perceptions of other 
people (e.g., “People who think of others before themselves seem to lose out in 
life.”).  Socio-political JWB encompasses one’s interpretation of social and political 
events (e.g., “The political candidate who sticks up for his principles rarely gets 
elected.”).  Each question is answered on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from strong 
disagreement to strong agreement.  Each dimension, as well as the total composite 
score, was examined.   
As a measure of target derogation, a global trait assessment was created based 
on a pool of trait adjectives developed by Alicke (1985; see Appendix D).  Ten 
bipolar adjectives (e.g., “mean – kind,” “unfriendly – friendly”) were selected from a 
larger body of adjectives determined by Alicke to be of moderate desirability and 
moderate control (compared to high or low).  In other words, adjectives were chosen 
that were not extremely undesirable or desirable and were also previously determined 
to be not completely in control of the person being described, yet not beyond their 
control.  Each pair is presented along a 7-point continuum from negative to positive.  
Higher scores indicate greater global attractiveness ratings. Derogation of the target 
was measured by subtracting the child’s attractiveness rating from the self-
attractiveness rating (e.g., see Lerner & Simmons, 1966).  
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Indicating the likability of the target, a modified version of the general 
likability scale developed by Reyesen (2005) was used (see Appendix E).  The scale 
consists of general statements measuring likability (e.g., “This child is likable,” “I 
would babysit this child”), adapted to be appropriate for evaluating a ten-year- old- 
child.  It was found, during a pilot study, that the modified scale was reliable and 
internally consistent, measured by Cronbach’s alpha reaching .80.   The scale consists 
of 11 items, each rated on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all), to 7 (very 
much/extremely).   
 Manipulation check.  The manipulation check involved an assessment of 
whether the child had been described as having an illness (yes or no), followed by an 
open-ended question regarding what illness had been described if the respondent 
stated “yes.”  An assessment of the severity of the illness followed based on a 7-point 
Likert scale ranging from not at all serious to very serious (see Appendix F). 
Design 
There were two independent variables in the current study, type of illness and 
physical attractiveness.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight 
conditions: an attractive child described in good health, with brain cancer, with 
Haltmar’s disease described as a brain tumor, or with Haltmar’s disease described as 
brain cancer but not labeled as “cancer” versus an unattractive child described with 
one of the four illness labels.  The independent variable of physical attractiveness was 
investigated by participants being randomly assigned to view a photograph of the 
presumed victim that was either manipulated to look unhealthy or left in its original 
condition. 
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            Previous literature has indicated that varying levels of JWB influence people’s 
stereotypes about attractiveness.  Therefore, the Global JWB scale (Lipkus, 1991; see 
Appendix C) was included as an exploratory measure and scores were used as a 
covariate.   
In summary, there are four levels of health and two levels of physical 
attractiveness. Hence, the study employed a 4 (type of illness) x 2 (physical 
attractiveness) factorial design, with JWB used as a covariate. 
Procedure 
               The study commenced after informed consent was acquired.  The 
instructions indicated that the study would take no longer than 30 minutes. 
Participants began by filling out the Global JWB (Lipkus, 1991).  Next, participants 
were shown a photograph (either left in its original condition or manipulated to 
appear unhealthy).  Immediately after, the stimulus paragraph was administered (good 
health, brain cancer, Haltmar’s disease - tumor, Haltmar’s disease - cancer). Next, the 
social attractiveness rating scale (Alicke, 1985) of the target individual was 
completed.  Participants were then asked to reflect back to when they were 10 years 
old and rate themselves on the same social attractiveness scale.  The target likability 
scale was then filled out by the participants (Reyesen, 2005), the last measured 
variable.  Finally, the manipulation check was completed.  
Results 
 In order to determine whether severity of illness was successfully manipulated 
via the illness label conditions, a one-way ANOVA was conducted with illness label 
(good health, Haltmar’s tumor, Haltmar’s cancer, cancer) as the independent variable 
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and the item assessing perceptions of the illness’ severity as the dependent variable. 
This analysis yielded a significant effect for illness label, F(3, 199) = 140.34, p < 
.001.  Duncan’s post hoc test showed that good health (M =.80, SD = 1.34) was rated 
as the least severe condition and significantly different than the other three 
conditions.  Haltmar’s tumor (M = 5.27, SD = 1.81) and Haltmar’s Cancer (M = 5.64, 
SD = 1.45) were rated as similar in severity, but were rated as more severe illness 
conditions than good health, yet less severe than cancer.  Cancer (M = 6.33, SD = 
2.64) was rated as the most severe and was significantly different than the other three 
conditions.   
Effects on Derogation 
Derogation scores (self-ratings of social attractiveness minus child-ratings of 
social attractiveness) were submitted to a 4 (illness type) x 2 (attractiveness of child) 
between-subjects factorial ANOVA in order to test Hypotheses 1a and 1b.  No 
significant effects emerged for the analyses, all Fs < 1.0, ps > .05.  Most notably, this 
included the main effects predicted for Hypotheses 1a and 1b:  There were no 
significant differences between groups relative to the illness label for derogation of 
the target, F(3, 286) = 0.38, p = .77.  It was found that participants did not rate the 
child with cancer more favorably than the child portrayed in the other three 
conditions as was anticipated in Hypothesis 1a.  Similarly, Hypothesis 1b was not 
supported in that derogation of the child did not occur linearly for severity of illness.  
See Table 1 for means and standard deviations.   
Hypothesis 2, predicting a main effect of the child’s attractiveness on 
derogation, was also not supported, F(1, 286) = 0.01,  p = .92.  Specifically, the 
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attractive child (M = -1.37, SD = 8.28) was not rated more favorably than the 
unattractive child (M = -1.27, SD = 8.47).  The fact that neither of the main effects 
were significant also disconfirmed Hypothesis 3a, which anticipated that cancer held 
unique conceptions and that the child with cancer would be rated more favorably than 
the child target in the other three illness conditions (impact of illness label).   
Finally, no significant interaction emerged between illness type and child 
attractiveness, F(3, 286) = 0.99, p =.40. Thus, Hypothesis 3b was not confirmed.  The 
severity of illness did not appear to activate differential beliefs (presumably related to 
belief of a just world) for the attractive versus the unattractive child.  
Effects on Likability 
Scores for general likability of the child were submitted to a 4 (illness type) x 
2 (attractiveness of child) between-subjects factorial ANOVA.  Contrary to 
Hypothesis 1a and 1b, no main effect was found for illness type, F(3, 286) = 1.89, p 
=.13.  In other words, participants judged the target as equally likable regardless of 
the illness label (Hypothesis 1a) or the illness severity (Hypothesis 1b).  See Table 2 
for means and standard deviations.   
Hypothesis 2 was not supported due to the fact that the main effect for child’s 
attractiveness was not significant, F(1, 286) = 0.14, p = .71.  Perceptions of the target 
were not affected by how attractive (M = 60.59, SD = 9.84) or unattractive (M = 
60.23, SD = 8.47) the child was portrayed to be.   
Given that both main effects were not significant, Hypothesis 3a predicting 
that attractiveness level and illness label would lead to similar judgments of the target 
was not supported.  It seems that the label of cancer did not elicit unique perceptions 
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in participants (i.e., the impact for illness label was not found).  However, a 
significant illness x physical attractiveness interaction did emerge for ratings of 
likability, F(3, 286) = 3.27, p = .02, ηp
2
 = .033.  Follow-up, post hoc analyses 
demonstrated that when participants viewed the healthful, attractive picture, there 
were no significant differences regarding judgments of the target relative to the 
severity of illness, F(3, 148) =0.43, p =.74, contrary to what was predicted for 
Hypothesis 3b.  However, when participants viewed the unhealthy picture, ratings of 
likability did vary across illness labels, F(3, 138) = 4.72, p =.004, ηp
2 
=.09.  As seen 
in Table 2, Duncan’s post hoc tests revealed that when participants viewed the 
unattractive photograph, the children suffering from Haltmar’s disease described like 
cancer and cancer were viewed as similarly likable, while the children suffering from 
Haltmar’s tumor and good health were also viewed similarly.   Interestingly, 
participants in both conditions that described the illness as involving abnormal cells 
judged the child as less likable than the child described as having Haltmar’s tumor or 
no illness.  This partially supports Hypothesis 3b in that severity of illness impacts 
favorability judgments, but the results indicated that this is only the case if the child 
looks sickly. 
Exploratory Analyses 
To explore the data further, a 4 (illness label) x 2 (attractiveness of child) 
between-subjects, factorial ANCOVA was performed on derogation and likability 
scores, using JWB as a covariate.  Because these analyses were not predicted, a 
Bonferroni correction formula was implemented to control for family-wise error.  
This yielded a cut-off value of .006 for alpha.   JWB was a significant covariate for 
PERCEPTIONS OF ILLNESS  28 
 
likability, F(1, 285) = 31.94, p < .001, ηp
2
= .10, however, it was not a significant 
covariate in the analysis of derogation,  F(1, 285) = 1.43, p = .23.  Therefore, only the 
inclusion of JWB as a covariate for the 4 (illness label) x 2 (attractiveness of child) 
ANCOVA with the likability ratings will be discussed below. 
It was found that using JWB as a covariate did not significantly alter the 
results of the original 4 (illness label) x 2 (attractiveness of child) ANOVA (without 
the inclusion of JWB).  Specifically, the main effect for illness label was not 
significant using the corrected alpha criterion, F(3, 285) = 2.35, p = .07, ηp
2
=.03.  
JWB also did not affect the already non-significant main effect for the child’s 
attractiveness, F(1, 285) = 0.33, p = .57, ηp
2
=.001. Finally, the illness label x child 
attractiveness interaction was not significant either, F(3, 285) = 3.63, p = .01, ηp
2
=.04.  
Therefore, JWB did not appear to impact judgments of the child.  See Table 3 for 
adjusted means and standard errors.   
Discussion 
Previous research regarding perceptions of a person who is suffering from an 
illness has found conflicting evidence surrounding how severity of the illness affects 
attributions made about the person inflicted.  Specifically, Gruman and Sloan (1983) 
found that, as severity of illness increases, perceived favorability of the target person 
decreases, except when the person was described as suffering from cancer.  By 
contrast, Stern and Arenson (1989), as well as Drury et al. (2005), found that children 
who were described as either having cancer or being in remission from cancer were 
judged less favorably than children who were described as being in good health.  
Thus, the present study was aimed at identifying whether the label of cancer holds 
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unique attributional stereotypes relative to other severe illnesses when assessing a 
target. 
Contrary to the findings of Gruman and Sloan (1983), Hypothesis 1a, stating 
that participants would derogate the child less and judge her as more likable if she 
had cancer, relative to other illnesses, was not supported.  Recall, however, that 
Gruman and Sloan’s study suffered from several methodological shortcomings 
including the fact that they failed to control for the impact of disease contagion in 
their original study; the four illness conditions that were used were good health, 
indigestion, pneumonia, and stomach cancer.  Note that pneumonia is a highly 
contagious illness, whereas the other illnesses are not.   It may be that a contagious 
illness would activate greater feelings of vulnerability in a person, and, therefore, 
would increase the degree to which a person might feel threatened by the disease.  
According to Pyszczynski et al. (1995), the greater the perceived threat, the greater 
the need to distance oneself from the victim suffering, which could have been the 
reason why the pneumonia illness condition in Gruman and Sloan’s study lead to 
greater derogation of the target compared to the target with cancer.  
Also, Gruman and Sloan’s manipulation of severity of illness affected 
different parts of the body.  Indigestion and stomach cancer both affect the stomach, 
while pneumonia afflicts the lungs.  Therefore, it is possible that by holding the 
contagion constant and localizing all illnesses to the brain, thus eliminating 
confounding variables, the unique attributions made by participants within Gruman 
and Sloan’s cancer condition were eliminated.  In order to adequately isolate the 
“label” of cancer from the severity of the description itself, the current study utilized 
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a fictitious illness, Haltmar’s disease (modeled after the experiment performed by 
Meyerowitz et al., 1987).  In two of the four illness conditions, the label Haltmar’s 
was paired with either the medical description of brain cancer or with the medical 
description of a benign brain tumor.  Thus, participants would have the medical 
symptomology of an illness without the label itself (e.g., the description of cancer 
without the label of cancer).  The failure to find that the cancer victim was not rated 
as more likable than the victims of the other illnesses also deviated from the findings 
of Meyerowitz et al. (1987).  They found that participants in their study did rate the 
victim of cancer more favorably than the victim of the same named, fictitious disease 
(Haltmar’s).  Meyerowitz et al., however, explained aspects of preventability and 
controllability, as well as treatability, when describing each of their illness conditions, 
while the current study held those factors constant.  In fact, Meyerowitz et al. found 
that as the controllability of the illness decreased (regardless of the label), the 
perceptions of the target decreased as well.  This could have influenced the current 
results:  the described illnesses, in all of the illness conditions used, were low on 
controllability, preventability and treatability; therefore, the target afflicted with the 
illness would be anticipated to be rated as low on favorability.   
Although participants did not perceive the child target more favorably when 
she was described as having cancer, the manipulation check employed during the 
study does argue that the word “cancer” in a diagnosis might have implications for 
perceptions of the severity of an illness.   Cancer was perceived as being the most 
severe of the illnesses despite the fact that Haltmar’s cancer was described as a 
malignant growth of cells in the brain.  Indeed, no distinction in severity was 
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perceived between the two Haltmar’s conditions (although they were both perceived 
as more severe than good health), indicating that the manipulation of illness severity 
was only in part successful. 
The reduced impact of the severity of illness manipulation may explain why 
the results did not support Hypothesis 1b.  Rather than finding evidence that illness 
severity linearly influenced ratings of the child target, supporting Drury et al. (2005) 
and Stern and Arenson (1989), targets were not derogated more, nor were they rated 
as less likable, if they were described as having a more severe illness.  Instead, the 
child target was rated as similarly favorable across the conditions.  This could have 
been due to the fact that the Haltmar’s conditions may have been perplexing for the 
participants – Haltmar’s is a fictitious disease with more ambiguity and less 
familiarity than the good health and cancer conditions.  This was conspicuously 
demonstrated by the manipulation check in which more participants were lost from 
the Haltmar’s conditions (20 participants from Haltmar’s tumor and 25 from 
Haltmar’s cancer) than from the cancer and good health conditions combined (6 
participants were lost from the cancer and 5 from good health).     
The current study also failed to replicate previous research related to the 
influence of a physical attractiveness stereotype on judgments of a victim target.  
Specifically, in research performed by Callan et al. (2007), it was found that when a 
target is portrayed as attractive and described as having suffered severely prior to 
death, participants remembered the target as significantly less attractive than 
originally rated.  In other words, as a victim’s suffering increased, Callan and his 
colleague’s participants’ recollection of the target’s attractiveness decreased.   
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Stemming from this and other related research (e.g., Dion & Dion, 1987), it was 
predicted that ratings of the likability of the target, and the willingness to derogate 
her, would be related to how sickly (unattractive) she appeared.  Contrary to past 
literature, the physical attractiveness stereotype was not observed in the current study, 
thus Hypothesis 2 was not supported.  Participants judged the target similarly 
regardless of whether her photograph was made to appear sickly in appearance rather 
than healthy and attractive.  Rather than participants solely relying on physical cues to 
influence judgments, it could be assumed that participants utilized all the information 
that was presented in the study to judge the child. As supported by Eagly et al. 
(1991), it was found that people’s propensity to endorse the attractiveness stereotype 
decreased as the amount of other available information increases.   Therefore, 
participants used the photograph in combination with other presented information 
(e.g., the stimulus paragraph) to form an overall judgment of the child.   
On the other hand, Eagly et al.’s (1991) proposal that individuals use as much 
information as possible in order to form judgments of a target lends support to the 
partial success of Hypothesis 3b.  Hypothesis 3b predicted an interaction between 
attractiveness of the child and the illness portrayed for favorability judgments of the 
child.  When the derogation measure was used, no significant results were found, 
regardless of the child’s attractiveness.  When likability was used as the dependent 
measure, it was found that the illness condition had no impact on the ratings of the 
attractive target.  However, when the child was portrayed as sickly in appearance, the 
child suffering from cancer or  Haltmar’s disease described like cancer was viewed as 
similarly likable, but less so than the child suffering from Haltmar’s tumor or the 
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child in good health.   Therefore, it appears that the unattractive targets in conditions 
which described illnesses involving malignant or cancerous cells are judged as less 
likable than those targets described with a less ominous illness description or as 
described in good health.  It may be, however, that the salience of the manipulation is 
boosted when the person depicted actually looks sick.  
Derogation measures (self- versus other-trait assessments) have been used for 
decades in a variety of empirical contexts.  More specifically, they have been 
successfully used in experiments regarding victimology (e.g., Lerner & Simmons, 
1966).  Previous research has demonstrated that derogation is likely when assessing a 
victim, presumably due to a participant feeling threatened and vulnerable.  A question 
that emerges from these findings is why the derogation measure failed to demonstrate 
differences across illness types in comparison to the likability measure for the child 
target.  By its nature, the current study’s derogation measure seems to be a more 
thoughtful measure for the individual to undertake because it requires reflection about 
oneself as a child relative to the current child target.  This reflective derogation, to the 
best of my knowledge, is the first of its kind. This more conscious, effortful aspect of 
the measure may be the reason for why it failed to discriminate between ratings of the 
target across illness conditions.   
Indeed, college-aged participants may have had difficulty comparing 
themselves retrospectively to a child this young. The limited research relevant to the 
current study uses social favorability measures rather than derogation measures. 
Recall that the studies performed by Drury et al. (2005) and Stern and Arenson 
(1989) illustrated that when a child was portrayed as ill, participants were willing to 
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rate the child victim unfavorably relative to a child who was not ill.  However, in the 
aforementioned studies, participants were not asked to compare themselves to the 
target; that is, the participants were not actually given the opportunity to literally 
derogate the child.  Thus, the current research suggests that participants may be 
reluctant to participate in this form of active derogation, especially with such a young 
target.  
It could also be assumed that the simple fact that there was an age discrepancy 
between the target and the participant could have influenced the derogation measure.  
Recall that Gruman and Sloan (1983), as well as other experimental studies, relied on 
the manipulation of similarity when assessing derogation.  That is, when derogation 
measures have been used in the past, the participants are presented with a story about 
a target that is similar to them (similar in age, similar in situation – e.g., in college, 
etc.), with the exception of suffering from some ill fate.  When participants are asked 
to rate the target as well as themselves on a series of items, defensive distancing has 
been observed (Pyszczynski et al., 1995).  For example, Pyszczynski et al. found that 
the more similar one is to the target described, the more likely one is to deny 
similarity to the target (therefore, denying the possibility of same fate as the target), 
and subsequently, derogation is generally implemented.   The current study involved 
a 10 year-old target while the participants were college-aged.  The “creative solution” 
of asking participants to reflect back to when they were 10 years-old seemed to be 
challenging for participants and resulted in insignificant findings as described above.  
The difficulty that can be assumed in reflecting back to one’s childhood, coupled with 
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the lack of similarity to the target, may have ultimately rendered the derogation 
measure ineffective. 
The likability measure, on the other hand, seemed to be more sensitive to 
underlying judgmental tendencies. The likability measure was composed of 
statements that encapsulate more behavioral and interaction-centered components 
regarding the target. For example, the likability measure asked whether the 
participant would want to babysit for the child target.  Though it may have been 
difficult for a participant to bluntly rate a child as socially unattractive compared to 
oneself, it may be surmised that it is easier for participants to be forthright in limiting 
one’s potential future interactions with the target child.  In other words, participants 
indicating that they would not want to play with the child who is ill may be easier 
than disclosing that they think the child is “uncooperative” or “unkind” simply due to 
being inflicted with an illness.  
Another possible reason for the inconsistent findings between the derogation 
measure and the likability measure could have been the role of delay.  In a study 
examining defensive distancing, Pyszczynski et al. (1995) found that after a 3 minute 
delay, participants’ liking for a target with cancer was lower compared to those who 
completed the favorability scale immediately after the stimulus materials.  In the 
current study, delay was not intentionally manipulated like Pyszczynkski et al. did, 
rather the derogation measure was taken immediately after the stimulus materials 
were presented while the  likability scale was filled out approximately 3 minutes after 
the stimulus materials were presented . Similar to Pyszczynski et al., it appears that 
participants in the current study may have had more time to internalize the severity of 
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the situation and the seriousness of the illness while completing the likability 
measures as compared to the derogation measures. Therefore, the likability measure 
detected participants defensive distancing and lack of favorability more so than the 
derogation measure, but again, only if the child looked sickly.  Future research should 
intentionally investigate the role of delay within the current study’s design to further 
explore if this was a coincidental finding or if it was, in fact, due to participants’ 
unconscious internalization of the circumstances of the target.  
Although a person’s propensity to endorse JWB has been demonstrated to be 
influential in victim judgments in previous literature (e.g., Lerner, 1965), JWB was 
not found to be an influential factor in the current study.  JWB was found to be a 
significant covariate in the analysis (only when likability was the dependent variable), 
but it did not alter any of the original findings when it was not included, and 
therefore, it did not seem to contribute any additional information. This could be 
attributed to several factors.  One speculation could be that participants’ 
endorsements of JWBs may not have surfaced due to the fact that they were judging a 
10-year-old child who is presumably under the care of his or her parents.  It may be 
unlikely for participants (even those endorsing JWBs) to blame the child for 
unfortunate circumstances.  By contrast, if participants were presented the 
opportunity to judge the parent(s) of the child, they may be willing to rate them 
unfavorably relative to a child, and thus, engage in derogation.  Previous literature 
has, indeed, found the tendency for people to hold parents responsible, rather than a 
child, for negative health-related circumstances such as obesity (Lightspeed Research, 
2006).  It seems that people hold parents accountable for circumstances beyond the 
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child’s control, such as the food available for the child to eat, rather than blaming the 
child.  
The child’s lack of control over her health situation raises another interesting 
point regarding the lack of derogation evidence.  It has been shown that the less 
control that a target has over an illness, the less likely individuals will be to derogate 
him or her.  All of the described illnesses in the current study are beyond the control 
of the child victim.  Even in the Haltmar’s conditions, for which participants 
presumably lack familiarity with the diagnosis and illness label, one could assume 
that the illnesses described could not be attributed to the child’s choices and, 
therefore, participants would reasonably be reluctant to derogate the child target. 
Another potential reason for JWB not impacting the results could be that the JWB 
measure used in the current study differed from previous research cited.  That is, in 
the current study participants were asked to fill out the Global JWB scale developed 
by Lipkus (1991) instead of a more commonly used measure developed by Rubin and 
Peplau (1975).  Rubin and Peplau’s succinct measure has proven to be successful in a 
variety of empirical areas, yet Lipkus’ (1991) scale was selected because of 
reportedly higher validity and reliability scores (Hellman, Muilenburg-Trevino, & 
Worley, 2008), as well as it being a purportedly more encompassing scale, embedded 
with three sub-dimensions (personal, interpersonal, and socio-political).  Future 
research should utilize a variety of scales to investigate if certain manipulations 
activate different mental frameworks that can be detected more so using specific 
scales.   
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Similarly, future research should attempt to clarify the circumstances under 
which college-aged students might derogate children.  As recommended before, 
possibly giving participants the opportunity to judge the target child’s parents may 
illuminate why the derogation measure in the current study was not successful.  It is 
important to know if adults perceive children with illness differently than adults 
perceive another adult with an illness. Possibly, there is something unique about 
perceptions of a child portrayed with an illness.  Regardless of illness type, children 
may be perceived as fragile and more capable of receiving compassion and sympathy 
and, therefore, be less vulnerable to the common derogation that is seen when adults 
rate other adults with illnesses.   
Overall, the current study suggests that adults may struggle with judgments 
about a child target.  In fact, it might not be an easy feat to identify the cognitive 
mechanisms that drive attributional judgments regarding a child. The current study 
used a photograph of a 10- year-old child who was, indeed, attractive. That is, the 
photograph that was used was of a pretty girl both before and after the manipulation 
of healthfulness.  This may have reduced the potency of the manipulation. In other 
words, altering the photograph to look sickly may not have been sufficient to 
eliminate the attractiveness.  Future research should consider illuminating the 
attractiveness stereotype regarding a child suffering from an illness when 
attractiveness is manipulated via depictions of healthfulness.  For example, hair loss 
is a common side effect of medications used to treat cancer.  It might be interesting to 
examine how a child depicted with and without hair would be perceived in similar 
studies.  
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One of the limitations of this research is that most college-age participants do 
not have medical knowledge to differentiate between malignant and benign clusters 
of cells.  Recall, that the cancer description utilized the word “cancerous” to describe 
the cells in the diagnosis.  Furthermore, participants did rate the cancer condition as 
more severe than the Haltmar’s condition in which the cluster of cells was described 
as malignant.  It is possible that undergraduate students in this study may not have 
been aware that the word malignant was equated with cancerous. Perhaps providing 
participants with more information regarding the diagnosed illness would improve the 
design such that stereotypes about the target would not be confounded with lack of 
disease familiarity. This may be alleviated in future research by having a preliminary 
study providing definitions for each illness condition.  That is, enrolling participants 
in a two-part study, the first of which would aim to teach participants the diagnostic 
terms and differences between illness descriptions, and the second part of the study 
would resemble the current study.  This could potentially cause an increase in the 
observed differences of severity of the illnesses and the likability of the respective 
target.    
Despite the limitations, the current study is an important line of research, 
specifically due to the fact that cancer is the number one disease in children causing 
more than 1,400 deaths per year (American Cancer Society, 2009).   Campaigns in 
the media commonly use images of adults and children who are suffering from a 
disease.  Raising the money needed to fund that research could be enhanced by using 
information from the current study and the related literature.  Furthermore, this 
information can be used to guide future research on the cognitive frameworks 
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activated when presented with a person suffering from an illness.  This is important 
research to continue when one considers its applications to medical professions, 
charity campaigns, and general advertisements.   
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Table 1 
 
Means (M) and Standard Deviations (SD) Across Illness and Picture Conditions for 
Derogation 
 
 
Illness 
 
  Good Health   Haltmar’s Tumor Haltmar’s Cancer  Cancer 
 
Picture      M (SD)           M (SD)         M (SD)  M (SD) 
 
Unattractive     -2.31 (7.70)       -1.16 (8.96)    -1.14 (9.37)          -.36 (8.38)
           
Attractive      -.68 (7.05)          .34 (10.62)    -2.67 (8.18)         -2.37 (7.09)
           
Total       -1.51 (7.39)          -.37 (9.82)              -1.99 (8.69)        -1.39 (7.76) 
 
Note. Means are not significantly different at p < .05. 
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Table 2 
 
Means (M) and Standard Deviations (SD) Across Illness and Picture Conditions for 
Likability 
 
 
Illness 
 
  Good Health   Haltmar’s Tumor Haltmar’s Cancer  Cancer 
 
Picture      M (SD)           M (SD)         M (SD)  M (SD) 
 
Unattractive   63.12a (8.86)       63.16a (9.35)         56.38b (9.90)         57.97b (10.88)
  
Attractive   60.55c (9.49)       59.37c (9.89)         60.41c (11.94)        62.00c (8.17)
  
Total    61.87 (9.21)         61.18 (9.75)          60.20 (11.18)         58.45 (9.74)       
 
Note. Means that share the same subscript within picture are not significantly 
different at p < .05 using Duncan’s post hoc test.  
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Table 3 
 
Adjusted Means (M) and Standard Errors (SE) Across Illness and Picture Conditions 
 for Likability with JWB Covariate 
 
 
Illness 
 
  Good Health   Haltmar’s Tumor Haltmar’s Cancer  Cancer 
 
Picture      M (SD)           M (SD)         M (SD)  M (SD) 
 
Unattractive    63.15 (1.44)         63.09 (1.65)   57.91 (1.74)          56.07 (1.50)
  
Attractive    60.58 (1.47)        59.72 (1.58)   61.95 (1.57)          60.48 (1.46)
           
 
Note. Means are not significantly different at p < .006. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
From:  Dr. Timothy Ludwig, Institutional Review Board  
Date: 5/05/2011  
 
RE: Notice of IRB Approval by Expedited Review (under 45 CFR 46.110)  
Study #: 10-0198  
Study Title: Attractiveness Stereotype Applied to Children with Cancer  
Submission Type: Modification 
Expedited Category: (7) Research on Group Characteristics or Behavior, or Surveys, 
Interviews, etc.  
 
Approval Date: 5/02/2011  
Expiration Date of Approval: 3/21/2011 
 
This submission has been approved by the Institutional Review Board for the period 
indicated. It has been determined that the risk involved in this modification is no more than 
minimal.  
 
Investigator’s Responsibilities:  
Federal regulations require that all research be reviewed at least annually. It is the Principal 
Investigator’s responsibility to submit for renewal and obtain approval before the expiration 
date. You may not continue any research activity beyond the expiration date without IRB 
approval. Failure to receive approval for continuation before the expiration date will result in 
automatic termination of the approval for this study on the expiration date.  
 
You are required to obtain IRB approval for any changes to any aspect of this study before 
they can be implemented. Should any adverse event or unanticipated problem involving risks 
to subjects occur it must be reported immediately to the IRB. 
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Waiver of Documentation of Informed Consent for Participants in Research Projects 
Involving Human Subjects 
 
 Title of Project:  Perceptions of Children     
 
 Investigator(s):  Alexandra Telk, Doris Bazzini, PhD   
 
 I. Purpose of this Research/Project: 
 To examine factors that influence adults’ judgments of children 
 
 II. Procedures: 
 You will be asked to read a paragraph, view a photograph, complete five 
relatively brief surveys, and complete a demographic questionnaire.  The entire study 
will take less than thirty minutes. 
 
 III. Risks: 
 Participation has no foreseeable risks.  However, if you wish to withdrawal 
from the study, at any time, for any reason, you may do so without repercussions.   
 
 IV. Benefits: 
 The study will provide insight on decision making and judgments that relate to 
children.  There are no direct benefits of participating in this study. 
 
V. Extent of Anonymity and Confidentiality: 
   There will not be anything containing any identifying information of your 
participation in the study, specifically no names will be recorded, and therefore 
participation is anonymous and confidential. 
 
VI. Compensation: 
 You will receive course credit as specified by my instructor if applicable.  
 
VII. Freedom to Withdraw: 
 If at any time you feel uncomfortable, or for any reason wish not to continue 
with the study, you have the freedom to withdraw.  
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VIII. Approval of Research  
 
This research project has been approved, as required, by the Institutional Review 
Board of Appalachian State University  
 
_______3/22/2010______________ _______3/21/2011___________  
IRB Approval Date    Approval Expiration Date  
 
 
IX. Subject's Responsibilities  
 
I voluntarily agree to participate in this study. I have the following 
responsibilities:  
 
 Read the stimulus paragraph and view the photograph thoughtfully. 
 Answer questions seriously and honestly to the best of my ability 
 Refrain from discussing this study (and my participation in it) until after the 
study has been completed 
 
Should I have any questions about this research or its conduct, I may contact:  
 
__Alexandra Telk,   843 425 3843    email: telkan@appstate.edu      
Investigator(s) Telephone/e-mail  
 
    Doris Bazzini, PhD  828 262 2733   email: bazzinidg@appstate.edu  
Faculty Advisor (if applicable)                                                  Telephone/e-mail  
 
 
Timothy Ludwig, Ph.D. (IRB Chair)  Phone: 828-262-2712   e-mail: 
irb@appstate.edu 
 
Graduate School and Research and Sponsored Programs 
Appalachian State University  
Boone, NC 28608  
irb@appstate.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institutional Review Board  
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APPENDIX B 
Target Photographs 
 
 
Original, not manipulated: attractive, healthy condition 
 
Manipulated: unattractive, unhealthy condition 
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APPENDIX C 
Global Belief in a Just World Scale 
Lipkus (1991) 
 
1. I think that I deserve the reputation I have among the people who know me. 
2. When I get “lucky breaks” it is usually because I have earned them. 
3. When I take examinations I rarely seem to get the grade I deserve. 
4. As a child I was often punished for things that I had not done. 
5. I am less likely to get hurt in traffic accidents if I drive with caution. 
6. I have found that people who work the hardest at their job are not always the ones 
to get promoted. 
7. If I watch what I eat, I will live longer. 
8. If I suffer a misfortune, I have usually brought it on myself in some way. 
9. Being nice to people will not necessarily bring me lots of friends. 
10. If I get mugged or raped, I am just plain unfortunate. 
11. In a job selection interview, the best applicant hardly ever gets the job. 
12. People who think of others before themselves seem to lose out in life. 
13. Parents who form good relationships with their offspring bring up more 
successful children. 
14. Friendly people have the best marriages. 
15. People who make the effort to invite people into their homes deserve lots of 
friends. 
16. People who offer help in times of crisis rarely find their help is reciprocated when 
they are     the ones in need. 
17. Lonely people are just no good at making friends. 
18. People who divorce have only themselves to blame for the unhappiness they may 
suffer. 
19. The group leader who prefers to solve group problems in a democratic fashion is 
less successful. 
20. Outward-going, sociable people deserve a happy life. 
21. The political candidate who sticks up for his principles rarely gets elected. 
22. It is rare for an innocent man to be wrongly sent to jail. 
23. Although evil men may hold political power for a while, in the general course of 
history good wins out. 
24. Crime does not pay. 
25. It is often impossible for a person to receive a fair trial in this country. 
26. In a free market economy, the only excuse for poverty can be laziness and lack of 
enterprise. 
27. Political representatives are more interested in getting into power than 
representing their constituency. 
28. The federal government has ensured that every citizen has an acceptable standard 
of living. 
29. The forces of law and order discriminate against black people in this country. 
30. Harsh as it may sound, mass unemployment has ensured that the people in work 
are the ones most deserving of employment. 
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APPENDIX D 
Social Desirability (Derogation)  
Alicke (1985) 
 
Each pair of words describes contradictory characteristics - that is, you cannot be 
both at the same time, such as very artistic and not at all artistic. 
The blank lines form a scale between the two extremes.  Please check the line that 
describes where you think the CHILD DESCRIBED IN THE PARAGRAPH falls 
on these dimensions. For example, if you think that the child would be extremely 
cooperative, you would check the line closest to cooperative.  If you thought the 
child was not particularly cooperative or uncooperative, you would check the 
MIDDLE MOST line. And if you thought the child was extremely uncooperative, 
you would check the line closest to uncooperative. 
 
The blank lines form a scale between the two extremes.  REFLECT BACK TO 
YOUR OWN CHILDHOOD AND THINK ABOUT WHERE YOU WOULD 
HAVE FALLEN ON THESE DIMENSIONS WHEN YOU WERE 10 YEARS 
OLD. For example, if you think that YOU were extremely cooperative, you would 
check the line closest to cooperative.  If you were not particularly cooperative or 
uncooperative, you would check the MIDDLE MOST line. And if you were 
extremely uncooperative, you would check the line closest to uncooperative. 
 
Uncooperative____   _____   _____   _____    _____     _____     _____   Cooperative  
 
Inconsiderate____    _____     _____   _____     _____     _____     _____ Considerate 
 
Irresponsible_____    _____    _____     _____     _____     _____   _____ Responsible 
 
Disrespectful _____    _____   _____     _____     _____     _____   _____  Respectful 
 
Unpleasant     _____    _____     _____    _____     _____    _____     _____    Pleasant 
 
Dishonest      _____    _____     _____     _____     _____     _____     _____    Sincere 
 
Mean             _____    _____     _____     _____     _____     _____     _____       Kind 
    
Dirty              _____    _____     _____     _____     _____     _____     _____       Clean 
 
Unreliable     _____    _____     _____     _____     _____     _____     _____   Reliable 
 
Unfriendly    _____    _____     _____     _____     _____     _____     _____   Friendly 
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APPENDIX E 
Likability Measure  
Reyesen (2005) 
  
1. This child is friendly 
2. This child is likeable 
3. This child is warm 
4. This child is approachable 
5. I would enjoy babysitting for this child 
6. I would enjoy playing with this child 
7. I would like this child to live in my neighborhood 
8. This person has attractive qualities for a 10 year old     
9. Looking back, I was similar to this child when I was 10 years old 
10. This child is knowledgeable for his/her age 
11. Hypothetically, I would allow my child to play with this child 
 
  
PERCEPTIONS OF ILLNESS  56 
 
APPDENDIX F 
Manipulation Check 
For the following questions, think back to the paragraph you read about the child. 
 
1. Did the child have a diagnosed illness?  _____ yes   ______ no 
2. If so, what illness did the child have? ______________________ 
3.  How serious would you say this illness is? 1 (Not at All) – 7 (Extremely Serious) 
4. How severe would you say this illness is? 1 (Not at All) – 7 (Extremely Severe) 
5.  How much impact would this illness have on this child’s life? 1 (Not Much) – 7 
(Substantial) 
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